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1 Introduction
There has been a passionate debate over the roles of non-cognitive values (e.g., moral,
political,  or  cultural  values)  in  the  context  of  justification  of  scientific  theories.  The
traditional view claims that these values cannot have a relevant, beneficial role because they
undermine  those  aspects  of  scientific  reasoning  from which  science  draws  its  epistemic
authority  (e.g.,  McMullin  1982;  Lacey  1999).  More  recently,  several  philosophers  have
challenged this view and claimed that non-cognitive values play a relevant role in the context
of justification (e.g.,  Longino 1990; Rooney 1992; Anderson 1995; Intemann 2005). This
paper  joints  the  second  camp  by  demonstrating  that  a  particular  kind  of  non-cognitive
values---feminist  values---does  not  necessarily  compromise  the  epistemic  authority  of
science. On the contrary, in some circumstances, they can improve scientific reasoning.
Furthermore,  we  argue  that  the  dichotomy  between  cognitive  and  non-cognitive
values does not do justice to the role of values in the context of justification. Traditionally,
non-cognitive  values  are  conceived of  as  a  group of  culturally  determined values  whose
influence on theory choice1 is a threat for the objectivity of scientific research. However, in
the same way that not all cognitive values promote strictly epistemic goals such as truth and
empirical adequacy, not all non-cognitive values have a noxious role in theory choice. In fact,
they can exert a legitimate, beneficial influence on scientific research and can take cognitive
and non-cognitive roles at the same time. To defend this thesis, we analyze the influence of
feminist values on several hypotheses and theories in evolutionary psychology
This paper proceeds as follows: we begin in Section 2 with a discussion of cognitive
vs. non-cognitive values in science, where we challenge the traditional dichotomy between
these  two groups of  values.  In  Section  3,  we introduce our  case  study:  the  evolutionary
explanation of human sexual behavior. In particular, we focus on Sexual Selection Theory,
Parental  Investment  Theory,  and  Sexual  Strategies  Theory.  In  Section  4,  we  present  the
feminist critique of this explanation and show how feminist values can lead us to a better
assessment of those theories. The final Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
2 Cognitive vs. Non-Cognitive Values: Challenging the Divide
Science pursues the acquisition of knowledge and enjoys a high epistemic authority.
Should  values  play  a  role  in  this  process?  And  which  values  are  compatible  with  good
scientific  research?  Typically,  a  distinction  is  made  between cognitive  and non-cognitive
1 Throughout the paper, we use “theory choice” as a shorthand for the assessment and 
selection of theories on the basis of scientific evidence.
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values.
The  first  group  of  values,  cognitive  values,  comprises  those  values  that  are
constitutive  of  scientific  activity  and that  are  considered  the  scientists’ “shared  basis  for
theory  choice”  (Kuhn 1977,  357):  predictive accuracy,  consistency,  scope,  simplicity  and
fruitfulness. Not all cognitive values may favor the same theory, and their relative weight
may vary across individual scientists. Nonetheless, it is commonly recognized that they are
crucial virtues of scientific theories and legitimate assessment criteria in theory choice (see
also McMullin 1982).
The second group of values is called non-cognitive values. It comprises those values
that origin in society as a whole: moral, personal, social, political and cultural values such as
pleasure, justice, equality, and honor. Inspired by the influential writings of the sociologist
Max  Weber  (1904/88,  1917/88),  many  philosophers  have  defended  the  view  that  the
assessment  of  scientific  theories  should  not  be  affected  by  non-cognitive  values  (e.g.,
McMullin 1982; Lacey 1999; Mitchell 2004). One of the main problems is that in scientific
reasoning, non-cognitive values may overrule the scientific evidence and blur the ability of
the evidence to point us to the truth. Totalitarian empires in the 20th century, such as the
Third Reich or the Soviet Union, show how science can be reduced to a caricature if it is
guided by certain political values. Furthermore, non-cognitive values have the potential to
oppress diversity and free communication in science. For all  these reasons, non-cognitive
values are typically considered to be irrelevant and even dangerous in theory choice.  
Various philosophers have challenged this view. Helen Longino (1990) emphasizes
the  role  of  non-cognitive  values  in  cases  of  underdetermination  of  theory  by  evidence.
Moreover,  Rudner  (1953),  Hempel  (1965)  and  Douglas  (2000)  have  argued  that  non-
cognitive values play a legitimate role in  theory choice by means of their  impact on the
assessment of inductive risk. Values can help to deal with uncertainty in scientific reasoning,
e.g., by assessing the consequences of a mistaken theory choice. Finally, there is the semantic
point that the life sciences, and medicine in particular, are contaminated with social value
judgments, e.g., what counts as a disease, what is normal functioning of the human body or
the human mind, etc. (Lloyd 1993; Intemann 2001).
These  arguments  primarily  support  the  claim  that  we  cannot---and  should  not---
eliminate non-cognitive values from the process of theory choice (see also Intemann 2005;
Brown 2013; Brigandt 2015). But how can we tell beneficial from noxious non-cognitive
values? Recent papers on this question have proposed various criteria, ranging from intrinsic
as opposed to instrumental value (Hicks 2014), potential for adoption by all rational agents
(Psillos 2015), and degree of empirical support (Goldenberg 2015). 
Overall, there is disagreement on how to describe the role of non-cognitive values in
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theory choice, and how to distinguish between different kinds of cognitive values. In Section
4, we suggest a new strategy to answering these questions: we argue that time is ripe for
abolishing the dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive values and to conceive of the
cognitive relevance of values as a gradual matter.
To motivate this  claim,  let  us look at  cognitive values again.  Not all  of them are
directly  related to  the truth or  empirical  adequacy of the favored theory.  Douglas  (2009,
2013)  distinguishes between different  kinds of cognitive values:  the genuinely epistemic
values  or  'minimal  criteria'  (2009,  94)  that  are  directly  related  to  the  truth  or  empirical
adequacy  of  a  theory,  such  as  logical  consistency  and  predictive  accuracy,  and  more
pragmatic values where such a link is hard to establish.
For  instance,  simplicity  is  a  value  which  exemplifies  the  second  category.  Kuhn
(1977) and McMullin (1982) include it in their list of cognitive values, but McMullin notes a
couple of problems, too. First of all, it is vague and at least partially subjective. Second, even
when simplicity can be measured in a relatively exact way, e.g., in statistical model selection,
it is debatable whether simplicity is a good guide to empirical adequacy (Forster and Sober
1994; Burnham and Anderson 2002). Dependent on the context and the nature of the data at
hand, a ceteris paribus preference for simpler models need not promote our epistemic goals.
Similar claims may be made with respect to cognitive values such as fertility and explanatory
power: for example, J.D. Trout (2002) claims that feelings of understanding and explanation
are often based on an illusion of explanatory depth unrelated to the truth of a theory.
These  examples  show the  gradations  in  the  epistemic  import  of  cognitive  values.
What about the other way round? Are there non-cognitive values which are more valuable
than others? In this paper, we make a case for feminist values and argue that they fulfill a dual
role as cognitive and non-cognitive values. Feminist values are committed to some social
objectives---in particular, the emancipation of women in society---, but a specifically feminist
perspective on science gains cognitive relevance in at least three different ways: by raising
sensitivity to relevant evidence that was neglected due to androcentric bias, by challenging
one-sided  description  of  complex  phenomena,  and  by  suggesting  experimental  tests  of
stereotypical assumptions. This claim shall be defended with respect to feminist values in
evolutionary psychology, whose principles we introduce in the next section.
3 Human Sexual Behavior and Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology studies human cognition and behavior from an evolutionary
perspective. In this view, many psychological traits are adaptations2 evolved in our ancestors
2 Evolutionary psychology does not aim to provide adaptationist explanations for all traits. 
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during the era of Pleistocene. These mechanisms helped our ancestors to deal with many
adaptive problems, namely problems of survival and reproduction.  Although evolutionary
psychology is a recent approach, over the past 30 years it has been an extraordinarily prolific
source  of  hypotheses  concerning  human  behavior.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  claim  that
evolutionary  psychology  has  revolutionized  the  study  of  human  behavior.  Evolutionary
psychologists are aware of this success and propose their approach as a unifying framework
for  psychological  science  (Buss  and  Reeve  2003).  Despite  this  success,  many  scientists
challenge  the  soundness  and  reliability  of  this  research  by  questioning  its  theoretical
principles  and  methods  (Gould  and  Lewontin  1979;  Richardson  2007).  More  precisely,
several  scholars  criticize  a  specific  line  of  research  that  enjoys  great  popularity  within
academic and non-academic environments.3 The target  of  this  critique is  the inquiry that
David Buller calls  ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ in capital  letters (Buller 2005).  This school
boasts a group of influential researchers, such as David Buss, Steven Pinker, Leda Cosmides,
and John Tooby. In this paper, we analyze the account of human mating suggested by this
school,  i.e.,  Sexual  Strategies  Theory.  Such  a  theory---suggested  by  the  influential
psychologists David Buss and David Schmitt (1993)---aims at universal explanations of male
and female sexual behavior. Two important evolutionary theories compose the foundation of
this account, viz. Parental Investment Theory and Sexual Selection Theory. We explain these
theories in turn, beginning with the most time-honored theory: Sexual Selection Theory.
Charles  Darwin  observed  that  in  several  species  sexes  differ  in  respect  to  many
features, such as size, colors, and behavior. Moreover, since some of these characteristics
would not favor the survival of individuals, Darwin thought that natural selection could not
explain these features. For instance, Darwin was puzzled by the flashy train of peacocks: how
can a peacock survive and defend himself with that iridescent train that makes him more “like
a dandy than a warrior”? (Darwin 1871, 43). In order to explain these anomalies, Darwin
formulated  the  theory  of  Sexual  Selection.  In  this  view,  individuals  look  for  desirable
partners, i.e., partners with good genes and resources. The reason for this hunt is that good
partners  can  provide  them  with  an  healthy  offspring  that  can  survive.  The  ‘enigmatic’
features, such as the peacock's train, indicate the good genes of individuals. Hence, these
characteristics help to spread one's own genes, i.e., they help to solve the adaptive problems
of reproduction. 
Rather, it formulates explanations involving various products of evolution, such as 
exaptations and by-products.
3 It should be noted that different evolutionary studies of behavior coexist, such as 
behavioral ecology and evolutionary anthropology. These lines of research differ with 
respect to their theoretical tenets and methods. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
compare and assess these schools.
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Two mechanisms are especially important for sexual selection. First, the members of
one sex are involved in intrasexual competition, namely a competition to have sexual access
to the other sex. Individuals have evolved features that permit them to win the competition
with members of  the same sex and to  mate,  such as  the iridescent  train of the peacock.
Second, the other sex is involved in intersexual selection, also called ‘female choice’. These
individuals  have  certain  mating  preferences,  such  as  specific  color  and  structure  of  the
peacock's  train.  When it  comes to  human beings,  evolutionary psychologists  traditionally
think  that  while  men  are  involved  in  intrasexual  competition,  women do the  intersexual
selection.
Robert  Trivers  formulated  the  second  fundamental  theory  for  the  explanation  of
human mating  analyzed in  this  paper:  Parental  Investment  Theory.  By specifying  “the
conditions under which sexual selection would occur for each sex” (Buss 1999/2008, 16), this
theory constitutes the basis of Evolutionary Psychology’s account of human mating. Trivers
defined parental investment as “any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that
increases the offspring’s chance of surviving (and hence reproductive success) at the cost of
the parent’s ability to invest in other offspring” (Trivers 1972, 139).
Furthermore, he argued that while one sex invests less in offspring and is involved in
intrasexual  competition,  the  other  sex  invests  more  and  makes  the  intersexual  selection.
Triver’s argument hinges on anisogamy, namely sexual reproduction that depends on gametes
that differ in respect to quantity and size. This asymmetry is central to determine the amount
of  parental  investment.  The sex that  produces  few large,  costly  gametes  invests  more  in
offspring. These gametes are a rare and precious resource and individuals do not want to
waste  these precious  cells.  As a  consequence,  they  choose carefully  the  partner  that  can
assure good use of them. The sex that generates many small, cheap gametes, on the other
hand, invests less in offspring and is involved in the intrasexual competition. When it comes
to human beings, women produce large gametes, i.e., ova, and men generate small and cheap
gametes, i.e., sperm. Hence, traditionally, evolutionary biologists and psychologists claim that
women have a  greater  parental  investment  than  men.  Indeed,  women are  involved in  an
‘obligatory’ investment that is indispensable for the survival of the offspring, including nine
months of pregnancy and breastfeeding.
On the basis of Sexual Selection Theory and Parental Investment Theory, David Buss
and David Schmitt propose an ambitious theory to explain human sexual behavior:  Sexual
Strategies Theory (Buss and Schmitt 1993). Buss and Schmitt claim that human beings have
evolved preferences for certain sexual strategies that solve specific adaptive problems. In
particular, human beings engage in long-term and short-term strategies. While a long-term
strategy aims at long, monogamous relationships, a short-term strategy does not lead to a real
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commitment to a romantic relationship. Furthermore, they argue that “men and women have
faced different mating problems over human evolutionary history, at least in some delimited
domains, and therefore the principles that govern the mating of women and men are predicted
to be different in these domains” (Buss and Schmitt 1993, 205).
In particular, Buss and Schmitt argue that the different amount of parental investment
leads women and men to prefer divergent sexual strategies. While men are more inclined to
short-term mating than women, women look for long-term mating more often than men.4 By
pursuing long-term strategies, women have solved the adaptive problems connected to their
obligatory  investment.  Buss  and  Schmitt  claim  that   women's  reproductive  success  is
constrained by the resources they can get to ensure the survival of their offspring. Hence, by
means of long-term mating, women can find partners that can support them by providing
those resources, such as protection and food. Instead, men face their adaptive problem posed
by the big quantity of cheap gametes by preferring short-term strategies. That is to say, since
men's  reproductive success is  constrained by the number of women they can inseminate,
short-term mating allows them to use their big quantity of gametes and spread their genes. 
An  astonishing  amount  of  empirical  evidence  supports  the  predictions  of  Sexual
Strategies Theory concerning the existence of sex differences in the preference for mating
strategies (Buss et al. 1990, Schmitt et al. 2003). Indeed, manifold studies have detected sex
differences  in  the  desired number of  partners  (Schmitt  et  al.  2003).  Furthermore,  several
studies shows that while women value partners with resources and high status much more
than men (Gottschall et al. 2003), men's prefer partners who exhibit signals that are linked to
fertility more often than women (Buunk, Dijkstra et al. 2001, Confer et al. 2010).
The account  presented in this  section assigns an essential  role  in the evolution of
sexual behavior to the amount of parental investment. Feminist criticism has challenged this
assumption and provided studies that question the central function of anisogamy to determine
the amount of parental investment and the preference for some specific sexual strategies. In
the next section, we present this criticism and highlight the beneficial influence of feminist
values on the reliability and objectivity of an evolutionary account of human mating.
4 Feminist Critique of Evolutionary Biology and Psychology
Feminist  scholars  are  interested  in  detecting  and  fighting  forms  of  oppression  of
women. When it comes to science, feminists are especially committed to pinpoint the ways in
which scientific practice neglects women as an object of research and denies them an active
4 These claims are statistical, of course. Buss and Schmitt concede that women and men use
both strategies when they lead to benefits.
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role in the production of knowledge. In the last decades, a considerable feminist literature has
emerged in the fields of sociobiology, evolutionary biology, and psychology. Their critique
focuses on the influence of gender stereotypes on evolutionary explanations and is inspired
by specific political and social values, such as gender equality. In this section, we present
some feminist criticisms of the account described in the third section.5 
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  Evolutionary  Psychology  ascribes  a
fundamental role to parental investment in the evolution of sexual behavior. In this traditional
view,  women invest  more  in  offspring  than  men and they  solve  their  adaptive  problems
related  to  parental  investment  through  long-term strategies.  Several  feminist  researchers6
criticize  this  analysis  of  the  role  of  parental  investment  in  the  determination  of  sexual
behavior. 
We begin with critiques of  Sexual Selection Theory. By focusing on the effects of
sexual selection on females in various species, the primatologist and anthropologist Sarah
Hrdy (1986) has shown the inadequacy of the stereotypical picture of sex roles given by
Sexual  Selection  Theory.7 She  highlights  some  of  the  problematic  assumptions  of  this
traditional account:
“Assumptions  underlying  these  stereotypes  included,  first,  the  idea  that
relative male contribution to offspring was small, second, that little variance
exists  in  female  reproductive  success  compared  to  the  very  great  variance
among males, and third, that fertilization was the only reason for females to
mate.  While  appropriate  in  some  contexts,  these  conditions  are  far  from
universal.” (Hrdy 1986, 131)
Hrdy claims  that  evolutionary  theorists  have  ignored  many widespread behaviors,
shared by the majority  of primate species,  that  clash with the traditional  view of  female
coyness  in  mating.  For  instance,  scientists  did  not  collect  and  analyze  data  concerning
competition among females and concerning promiscuous mating that is not necessary for
5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete survey of feminist critiques of 
this account. For a broader analysis, see Gowaty 1997, Fehr 2012.
6 To simplify, we use ‘feminist researchers’ and ‘feminist evolutionists’ as synonyms and 
we refer to feminist scholars who criticize evolutionary biology and psychology but also 
try to integrate feminism and evolutionary theory. See Vandermassen 2005, Hannagan 
2008.
7 The study of nonhuman primates constitutes an important source of evidence for 
evolutionary psychology and biology. Since human beings and nonhuman primates share 
a common ancestor, evolutionary scientists think that the study of these animals can shed 
light on the adaptive problems of our ancestors. For a critique of comparative analysis as 
source of evidence see Buller 2005.
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fertilization. One of the reason why they neglected such evidence was that they assumed that
being sexually competitive was not advantageous for females (Hrdy 1981/1999, 11). Such a
problematic assumption constrained research to analyze females only in the role of mothers
and as passive resources available to males (Fedigan 2001, 49). As a consequence, since the
traditional account neglects data on the behavior of female primates, it only gives a partial
explanation of human sexual behavior and fails to provide an objective and comprehensive
picture.  Feminist  researchers,  instead,  have provided studies that include primate females'
behavior and challenge the stereotypical view of female coyness. As Fedigan argues, feminist
primatologists have improved research on sexuality by simply using research questions that
consider female sexual behavior. That is, besides studying the sexual behavior of males and
their adaptive advantage, feminist researchers began to investigate female sexual behavior.
For instance,  Hrdy (1981/1999) studied how females compete with other females to gain
resources and partners. Meredith Small (1993) analyzed how primate females choose good
partners.  Moreover,  Jeanne  Altmann  (1974)  criticized  androcentric  sampling  practices
involved in the study of animal behavior. In particular, she questioned 'ad libitum sampling',
i.e., recording anything that attracts scientists' attention. Altmann argues that “with ad libitum
sampling,  it  is  rarely  possible  to  determine  which  differences  in  data  are  due  to  true
differences between individuals, age-sex classes, or behavior, and which due merely to biases
in sampling” (1974, 236). All in all, androcentric values have contributed to a focus on male
behavior and on stereotypical female roles and this has hampered the production of adequate
explanations of primates' sexual behavior. 
Several primatologists and anthropologists, such as Hrdy (1981/1999) and Fedigan
(2001), argue that feminist ideas and values have had a beneficial influence on the work of
many researchers by pushing them to challenge orthodox ideas about sex roles generated by
cultural  stereotypes.  Unsurprisingly,  the traditional ideas about  sex roles turned out  to be
inadequate. It should be noted that Hrdy does not ascribe this success of feminist research to
the gender of the scientists involved. More precisely, she does not claim that female scientists
revolutionize  the  explanations  of  sexual  behavior  because  of  their  alleged  feminine
sensibilities. Rather, she points out the importance of political and social values. These values
put  scientists  in  a  better  epistemic  position  to  pinpoint  the  weakness  of  a  theory.  This
diagnosis is in line with our claim about the dual role of feminist values in science. 
It should be noted that Hrdy and Fedigan critique challenged the account of sexuality
developed  in  primatology,  sociobiology,  and  evolutionary  biology.  However,  the  same
criticisms are now legitimately raised in evolutionary psychology (Hrdy 1997). David Buss
claims that Sexual Strategies Theory admits that both sexes compete and are involved in mate
choice (2013, 171). In other words, Buss and Schmitt would not apply the traditional, narrow
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version of Sexual Selection Theory that views females as passive, coy individuals. However,
feminist evolutionists claim that there is a need to enhance the awareness of gender bias in
the application of Sexual Selection Theory (Ah-King 2007). That is to say, the traditional
version of this theory still constitutes the ideological framework in which human behaviors
are analyzed. Overall, women are still pictured as highly discriminating and sexually coy, and
men are still studied as undiscriminating, sexually adventurous individuals.
Feminist  researchers  also  criticize  Parental  Investment  Theory.  As  previously
mentioned, in the traditional view endorsed by Evolutionary Psychologists, males' parental
investment is rather small and, in principle, can amount to only one ejaculation necessary for
conception. Female investment, instead, is huge and includes pregnancy, breastfeeding, and
protection. Hrdy claims that research in primatology shows that males' parental investment is
far from being insignificant for the survival of the offspring. For instance, these studies show
that in many species, fathers are involved in direct care and protection (Hrdy 1976, 1986).
Moreover,  Ruth  Hubbard  has  challenged  the  traditional  criteria  to  measure  parental
investment and, above all, the role of anisogamy in such a determination (1990). Because of
the asymmetry involved in anisogamy, scientists traditionally assume that two aspects are
important for the evolution of human sexual behavior. First, females constitute rare resources
because  of  their  large,  scarce  eggs.  Second,  the  energy  that  women  invest  in  gametes
outweighs the energy invested by men in each sperm. Hubbard criticizes this approach to
measure this energy. She claims:
“[...] there is no reason to believe that females expend more energy (whatever
that  means)  in  the  biological  components  of  reproduction  than  males  do.
Among mammals, females indeed produce fewer eggs than males do sperm,
and females gestate the embryos, but it is not obvious how to translate these
facts into energy expenditures. Is it reasonable to count only the energy males
require  to  produce  the  few sperm that  actually  end  up fertilizing  eggs,  or
should one not count the total energy they expend in producing and ejaculating
semen (that is, sperm plus spermatic fluid) throughout their lives (however one
would do that)?” (Hubbard 1992 142)
According to Hubbard gamete size does not constitute the full story. An exhaustive evaluation
of male parental investment has to take into account several aspects, such as the actual efforts
to protect the offspring and the costs of male-male competition. Then, if it is true that males'
parental  investment  turns  out  to  be  greater  than  previously  believed,  evolutionary
psychologists should revise their predictions about men's preference for short-term strategies.
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In other words, if feminist research is right in claiming that the traditional determination of
the amount of parental investment is faulty, evolutionary psychologists should revise their
account of sexual behavior in humans.8 
In the light of these criticisms, it is unsurprising that also Sexual Strategies Theory,
which builds on Sexual Selection Theory and Parental Investment Theory, has come under
pressure.  This  theory  predicts  some  differences  between  men  and  women,  such  as
discrepancies in preferences for sexual strategies and number of partners desired. Although
Buss  and  Schmitt  claim  that  cross-cultural  data  have  confirmed  the  predictions  of  their
theory, feminist researchers have provided several studies that do not support this optimistic
assessment.  For  instance,  Perrin  et  al.  (2011)  have  designed  three  studies  to  test  the
assumption  concerning  the  different  desires  of  men  and  women  in  the  context  of  a
heterosexual  romantic  relationship.  Findings  do  not  support  the  differences  predicted  by
Sexual Strategies Theory. By contrast, these studies highlight several similarities in the self
reports of men and women concerning the desired loving behavior. They have detected just
one  clear  gender  difference:  women's  greater  desire  for  mutual  support  and  care  in  a
relationship.  Pedersen et  al.  (2011) have tested the hypothesis  that  men prefer  short-term
strategies  more  often  than  women do and failed  to  confirm it,  obtaining  results  that  are
inconsistent with Sexual Strategies Theory. Indeed, their studies show that preferences for
long-term strategies are widely shared among men and women. 
Andrew Smiler (2011) provides an extensive critique of Sexual Strategies Theory. As
mentioned, Sexual Strategies Theory predicts specific differences in the preference for mating
strategies. Smiler argues that evolutionary psychologists cherry-pick data to confirm these
predictions  (2011,  604).  On the  one  hand,  they  dedicate  a  deep analysis  to  the  different
motivations women and men have for having sex and to the divergent features of partners that
women and men find desirable.  On the other  hand, they do not  consider  the astonishing
amount of data that shows similarities between men and women. These similarities concern
the actual number of partners desired and the characteristics of partners that individuals rank
as more important (Buss & Schmitt 2003, Buss et al. 1990). It is worth noting that the data
showing these similarities are collected by the same proponents of Sexual Strategies Theory.
Why do they focus on sex differences and neglect the substantial similarities revealed by their
studies? According to Smiler, proponents of Sexual Strategies Theory “selectively focus on
only those findings that support their theory and mostly ignore their own findings that might
challenge Sexual Strategies Theory” (2011, 604).  Obviously,  this problem undermines the
reliability of Sexual Strategies Theory and its proponents have, sooner or later, to address it. 
Moreover,  Smiler  (2011)  notices  that  evolutionary  psychologists  claim  that  both
8 For further debate, see Vandermassen (2004, 2005) and Ah-King (2007). 
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evolutionary and contextual-individual factors are important for determining sexual behavior.
Nonetheless, the role of contextual-individual aspects is not seriously considered in Sexual
Strategies  Theory.  Feminist  research  has  been  much  more  sensible  to  this  problem.  For
instance, Chuck Tate (2011) has developed three studies to investigate the importance and
interplay between psychosocial, experiential, and evolutionary factors in the determination of
sexual behavior. In particular, she focuses on how these aspects affect the desired number of
sexual partners. She found out that some psychosocial variables do influence the desirable
number of sexual partners (2011, 649). Hence, Sexual Strategies Theory only gives a partial
account of human sexual behavior. 
All  in  all,  feminist  researchers  have  formulated  compelling arguments  against  the
traditional evolutionary explanation of human mating. 
Let us systematize the ways in which feminist values are beneficial for evolutionary
psychology. First, feminist values raise sensitivity to relevant evidence that was disregarded
because of androcentric or other biases. Salient examples include Hrdy's analysis of primates'
mating behavior that conflicts with the traditional view of the ‘coy female’ (1986, 138), and
the neglect of  similarities in human sexual behavior. This criticism calls for expanding the
evidence base for theory choice in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture. Second,
feminist  values  challenge  one-sided  descriptions  of  complex  phenomena,  such  as
anisogamy.  Hubbard  has  pointed  out  that  gamete  size  is  a  questionable  measure  for
quantifying parental investment and that theories based on this measure should be regarded
with  caution.  This  feminist  criticism  reveals  that  scientific  theorizing  in  evolutionary
psychology is sometimes based on problematic assumptions in the description of complex
phenomena.  It  also  suggests  alternative  descriptions  that  may  lead  to  more  balanced
theorizing. Third, feminist values suggest experimental tests of stereotypical assumptions,
such as gender differences in mating strategies and attitude toward romantic relationships
(Pedersen et al. 2011; Perrin et al. 2011). These studies target stereotypical claims that are
often tacitly assumed in evolutionary psychology, but have not been subjected to rigorous
test.  They  contribute  to  identifying  relevant  research  questions,  developing  useful
experimental designs and to a fair assessment of potentially problematic claims. Moreover, it
is  worth  noting  that  the feminist  critique has  pushed the evolutionary account  of  human
mating into a better fulfillment of some cognitive values. For instance, thanks to the influence
of feminist research, the external consistency of such an account improved by taking into
account the data collected by primatologists. In other words, feminist values have a positive
influence on evolutionary psychology by promoting theories that possess relevant cognitive
values.
Summing up, the feminist criticisms that we have explained in this section enhance
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both  the  theoretical  and the  evidential  basis  of  evolutionary  psychology.  Feminist  values
actively  contribute  to  the  core  activity  of  scientific  reasoning---gathering  and  analyzing
scientific evidence, assessing theories on the basis of that evidence---and they do so in a
beneficial  way  that  is  supposedly  reserved  for  cognitive  values.  Hence,  a  dual
characterization of feminist values in science as fulfilling both cognitive and non-cognitive
functions  seems  appropriate.  Feminist  values  have  a  non-cognitive  core,  that  is,  the
commitment  to  the  emancipation  of  women,  gender  equality,  freedom  of  patriarchal
oppression, and empowerment of women's lives. But if applied properly, this commitment
can improve the reliability of scientific reasoning and contribute to the core aim of science: a
sound assessment of theory and evidence. In this view, providing adequate theories of human
sexual behavior means doing justice to women and men. In the light of these findings, a sharp
distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values does not do justice to the diversity of
roles that values play in scientific reasoning. 
One might argue that the same could be said of noxious non-cognitive values such as
creationist or racist values.9 To the extent that these values promote a critical attitude towards
established scientific theories, and detect questionable assumptions, their influence seems as
legitimate  as  the  influence  of  feminist  values.  However,  this  analogy  misses  a  crucial
difference.  Creationist,  racist,  and feminist  values  are  not  on  a  par  with  respect  to  their
epistemic commitments.  For example,  creationist  values  involve a  priori  views about  the
origin of the universe that rule out several astronomical and biological theories from the start.
Racist values make similar a priori commitments about differences between human beings.
Feminist values are not committed to any such dogmatic theory concerning (the absence of)
differences between men and women, or the biological and psychological explanations of
human mating. They do not prevent the pursuit of any biological or psychological research
program.  Rather,  they  propose  a  perspective  for  discussing  and  criticizing  such  research
programs. To push this point to the extreme, it is compatible with feminist values that science
finds, at some point, substantial and robust intelligence differences between men and women.
Not that we have any evidence for such a claim: our point is rather that if we found such
evidence, feminist values would call for a critical scrutiny of the research method, search for
hidden biases,  etc.  But if  the research survived all  the scrutiny,  feminist  scientists  would
ultimately accept the outcome. As history has taught us, this is a substantial difference to
creation science and science guided by racist values (e.g., the Aryan Physics of the 1930s).
Thus, while there is no clash between feminist values and scientific research, creationist and
racist values constrain the development and improvement of scientific research.
It  should  be  noted  that  not  all  feminist  values  have  this  positive  role.  Indeed,
9 See Kourany 2010 for similar remarks.
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“feminism” is an umbrella term that denotes different and conflicting views, such as equity
feminism and gender feminism (Sommers 1994). As Barry Kuhle (2012) argued, while equity
feminism is not committed to any dogmatic view on men and women, gender feminism is.
That  is,  gender  feminism  is  committed  to  a  theory  that  rules  out  any  evolutionary
explanations  of  psychological  differences  between  men  and women.  By constraining  the
development  of  evolutionary  explanations,  gender  feminism's  influence  on  evolutionary
psychology is as noxious as the influence of racist values. Equity feminism, on the other
hand, does not involve such a dogmatic view. It just asks for a fair treatment of women in
evolutionary psychology,  i.e.,  it  asks  for  a  careful  study of  women's  psychological  traits.
Since  equity  feminism  fights  sexism,  it  is  involved  into  a  process  of  political  change.
Nonetheless, the aim of equity feminism is not formulating a “politically correct” account of
human  mating.  Rather,  it  aims  to  do  justice  to  women  by  fighting  bias  in  evolutionary
psychology, and striving for empirically adequate explanations of gender differences. Hence,
equity  feminism  not  only  does  not  contrast  with  evolutionary  psychology,  but  it  also
improves the reliability of its theories. 
Philosophers often propose a single criterion to evaluate the soundness of values and
their influence on scientific research (e.g., Hicks 2014, Goldenberg 2015, Psillos 2015). Our
case study suggests that things are more complicated: values in science cannot be evaluated
without keeping in mind their  context of application.  Only when we analyze how values
contribute  to  better  and  more  reliable  theories  in  a  specific  discipline,  we  can  make  a
judgment on their cognitive import. 
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to challenge the dichotomy between cognitive and non-
cognitive values and to replace it by a gradual account. From a theoretical viewpoint, this
project  is  motivated  by  recent  distinctions  between  properly  epistemic  and  secondary
cognitive  values  (Douglas  2013),  by  challenges  of  the  epistemic  relevance  of  traditional
cognitive values (e.g., Burnham and Anderson 2002; Trout 2002), and by arguments that non-
cognitive values may have a legitimate, albeit restricted, role in scientific reasoning (e.g.,
Intemann 2001; Douglas 2009). We have supplemented these theoretical arguments with a
case study on evolutionary psychology and the role of feminist values in criticizing certain
assumptions and inferences of that research program. 
Evolutionary Psychology is an ambitious research program aiming at the explanation
of  human  behavior---and  sexual  behavior  in  particular---by  means  of  evolutionary
adaptations. It has celebrated some spectacular successes, but it is also based on problematic
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assumptions,  e.g.,  the  central  role  of  anisogamy  and  female  coyness.  Feminist  research
uncovers these problems and the underlying biases, provides relevant evidence neglected by
the traditional view, and suggests studies that subject problematic assumptions to empirical
scrutiny.  At  the  same  time,  feminist  values  do  not  constrain  scientific  research  in  the
problematic manner that is typical of, e.g., racist or creationist values. We have also argued
that it is the commitment to particular socio-political values---fighting the neglect of women
as an object of study---that enables feminist researchers to voice their criticism and to identify
problems for Evolutionary Psychology. For these reasons, our study supports the view that
feminist values have a dual role in science: they support a certain political, non-epistemic
goal,  but  they  also  gain  cognitive  relevance  by  improving  the  reliability  of  scientific
reasoning and by contributing to better theory choice. What counts as a cognitive and a non-
cognitive value may therefore be a matter of gradation.
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